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SUMMARY
U.S. policy concerns over Taiwan in
recent years have centered on easing tensions
and striking a balance between the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan.  Despite
extensive Taiwanese trade with, and invest-
ment in, the Chinese mainland, the two sides
remain politically far apart and compete
strongly for international influence.  U.S.
policy in this triangular U.S.-PRC-Taiwan
relationship is complicated by a number of
factors.  
First, Taiwan is moving away from its
past advocacy of “one China” to positions
favoring an official international status for
Taipei.  These trends have been reinforced by
the results of legislative elections on December
1, 2001, in which the Nationalist Party lost its
governing majority for the first time in its 50-
year rule. The largest party in the legislature
now is the Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP), a party long associated with advocat-
ing independence for Taiwan.  Such a position
challenges Beijing’s claim to sovereignty over
the island.
Second, Beijing is strongly nationalistic
and remains adamant about its claim to Tai-
wan.  Also, Beijing continues to claim that it
has the right to use force against Taiwan – a
claim to which the United States objects.
Finally, many in Congress favor formal
efforts, including legislation, that go beyond
administration policy to strengthen U.S. rela-
tions with Taiwan in ways sure to antagonize
the PRC.
Meanwhile, U.S. officials in Congress and
elsewhere want to enhance investment oppor-
tunities for U.S. companies and ease trade
issues, notably Taiwan’s large trade surplus.
They also encourage political democratization,
even though it may foster separatist tendencies
among ethnic groups that Beijing regards as
threatening to state security.
Taiwan’s security and potential
vulnerability to the Chinese military is of
special concern.  The U.S. Defense Depart-
ment issued a congressionally mandated report
on rising military strengths on both sides of the
Taiwan Strait in 1999.  The report intensified
arguments on whether the United States
should provide ballistic missile defense systems
to Taiwan despite strenuous objections from
Beijing. In April 2001, President George W.
Bush approved the sale of four Kidd-class
destroyers, 12 anti-submarine P-3 “Orion”
aircraft, and eight diesel submarines to
Taiwan. Taiwan continues to seek Aegis
destroyers and other advanced weapons sys-
tems from the United States which could
enhance its defense capabilities.
Since 2000, Taiwan’s political landscape
has changed dramatically. Beginning with the
March 18, 2000, presidential election and
continuing through December 2001 legislative
elections, the formerly ruling Nationalist Party
has been defeated by opposition parties, nota-
bly the DPP party.  Success of the DPP and
other opposition parties is probably Beijing’s
most feared outcome in the elections, and
raises concerns that Taiwan-PRC tensions will
increase still further.  U.S. options include
attempting to negotiate a new arrangement to
manage U.S. relations with Beijing and Taipei,
or remaining flexible given competing pres-
sures from the two capitals, while deferring a





On March 12, 2002, Taiwan’s Defense Minister, Tang Yao-ming, left the United States
after attending a defense conference in Florida.  While here, Minister Tang also met with
senior U.S. diplomatic and defense officials, including Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul
Wolfowitz and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly.  PRC officials protested.
According to a Reuters report of January 15, 2002, the U.S. Navy will present Taiwan
with several plans for building 8 diesel-powered submarines in the next two months.  Along
with approving other weapons systems, President Bush approved the sale of diesel
submarines (which the United States has not built since the 1950s) in April 2001.
On December 1, 2001, Taiwan held legislative elections in which the Nationalist (KMT)
Party, formerly the dominant party in the legislature, lost its majority for the first time in 50
years.  In the new, 225-seat legislature, the DPP will have 87 seats, the KMT 68 seats, the
People First Party (PFP) 46 seats, the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) 13 seats, and the New
Party 1 seat.  The remaining 10 seats go to minority or non-party candidates.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Background to U.S. Interests in Taiwan
U.S. involvement with the government of Taiwan (known as the Republic of China or
ROC) has its roots in the World War II U.S. alliance with the Nationalist Chinese government
of Chiang Kai-shek, then on mainland China.  In October 1949, upon its defeat by the Chinese
communist forces of Mao Zedong, Chiang’s government fled to Taiwan, an island off the
south China coast.  While on the mainland the Chinese Communist Party established the
People’s Republic of China (PRC), Chiang’s ROC government on Taiwan insisted that the
communist government in Beijing was not credible, and that the administration on Taiwan
was the only legitimate government of all China.  For the next 30 years, the United States
supported this claim with U.S. military protection and over $5 billion in military and economic
aid, allowing Chiang’s one-party government (the Kuomintang Party, or KMT) to consolidate
its position on Taiwan.
In the 1950s and 1960s, U.S. forces used Taiwan as a forward base against Sino-Soviet
communism in Asia.  But after President Nixon’s opening to Beijing in 1971-72, and the
major pullback of U.S. forces in Asia under the guidelines of the “Nixon doctrine,” U.S.
officials came to view Beijing more as a strategic asset against the Soviet Union than an
adversary to be confronted in the Taiwan Strait.  On January 1, 1979, therefore, the United
States switched its diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing.  In the U.S.-PRC joint
communique announcing the change, the United States recognized the government of the
PRC as the sole legal government of China and acknowledged the Chinese position that there
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is but one China, and Taiwan is part of China.1  As part of de-recognition, the United States
also notified Taiwan authorities of intent to terminate, effective January 1, 1980, the 1954
U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty.  This move prompted extensive congressional debate at
the time over the President’s authority to unilaterally dissolve a defense treaty without prior
consultation with Congress.
In a unilateral statement released on December 16, 1978, the United States declared that
it “continues to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and expects
that the Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves.”  Subsequently,
the United States affirmed its security and other interests in Taiwan through the Taiwan
Relations Act (TRA) and the continued supply of U.S. arms to Taiwan. The TRA, which still
governs U.S. relations with Taiwan, was essentially a congressional construct, enacted by a
Congress unhappy with the Carter Administration’s minimal plans for how U.S. relations
were to be conducted with Taiwan after official relations were severed.2
With the thaw in the Cold War in the late 1980s and subsequent collapse of the Soviet
Union, U.S. interest in the PRC as a “strategic asset” in global politics declined.  The PRC’s
burgeoning economy and sometimes assertive foreign policy in the 1990s revived U.S.
interest in finding pragmatic and effective ways to deal with rising Chinese power.  At the
same time, Taiwan’s political system had undergone dramatic changes, including a transition
to democratic political pluralism.  The combination of these developments led to subtle
changes in U.S.-Taiwan ties, including deepening economic, military, social, and other
contacts.
Today, the United States is an important investor and trading partner for Taiwan.  U.S.
markets receive about 25% of Taiwan’s exports, while the United States supplies a much
smaller percentage of Taiwan’s imports, leading to a $14.9 billion U.S. trade deficit with
Taiwan in 1998.  Taiwan continues to enjoy Export-Import Bank financing, Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC) guarantees, most-favored-nation status, and ready access to
U.S. markets. Meanwhile, many U.S. leaders want to encourage Taiwanese enterprises to
invest in the United States.
Issues in U.S.-PRC-Taiwan Relations 
Arms Sales to Taiwan.  Continuing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are part of a decades-
long U.S. policy approach that often was termed one of “strategic ambiguity.”  On the one
hand, U.S. policymakers had promised not to recognize Taiwan as an independent entity with
an identity separate from the PRC’s.  On the other hand, the United States continued to sell
defense weapons and equipment to Taiwan and to have other, extensive contacts with Taiwan
under the auspices of the TRA, which still governs unofficial U.S. relations with Taiwan.  Of
particular importance in the current environment is the nature of U.S. defense commitments
and arms sales to Taiwan, contained in Section 3 of the TRA.  Section 3 is non-specific about
IB98034 03-15-02
CRS-3
the defense articles and services the United States may provide Taiwan.  It merely calls for
“such defense articles and services...as may be necessary,” and gives Congress a role in
determining what needs Taiwan may have.
Some in Congress believe that the TRA is outdated and that Taiwan’s self-defense
capabilities have eroded while China has grown militarily more capable and more hostile. As
evidence, they cite the conclusions of a congressionally mandated report assessing the military
balance in the Taiwan Strait, which was issued by the U.S. Department of  Defense (DoD)
in February 1999.  The report concludes that in light of improvements in offensive military
capabilities, by the year 2005 China will have acquired the ability “to attack Taiwan with air
and missile strikes which would degrade key military facilities and damage the island’s
economic infrastructure.”  Congressional proponents of enhanced security for Taiwan suggest
that U.S. policy should be adjusted accordingly.  Policymakers also remain disturbed that
China continues to insist publicly on its right to use force against Taiwan.
Even absent an adjustment in U.S. policy, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan long have prompted
strong objections from the PRC.  On August 17, 1982, a U.S.-PRC joint communique
addressed this point.  In that communique, the PRC cited it had a “fundamental policy” of
striving for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question.  The United States stated in the
communique that it did not
seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan
will not exceed, either in qualitative or quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in
recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and
China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan.
Since the 1982 communique, U.S. government arms sales to Taiwan have remained at
over $600 million a year, with two exceptions: President George H. W. Bush’s approval in
September 1992 for sale of 150 F-16 aircraft to Taiwan (the largest such sale, at $5.9 billion);
and President George W. Bush’s approval in April 2001 for sale of four Kidd-class
destroyers, 12 anti-submarine P-3 “Orion” aircraft, and eight diesel submarines.  (Previously,
Taiwan authorities also had sought to acquire the P-3 Orion aircraft and diesel submarines
from the Clinton Administration.  The White House turned down these requests based on a
recommendation from the Pentagon.)  Given that the United States has only built nuclear
submarines since the 1950s, discussions have been underway since April 2001 on plans either
to acquire the diesel subs from the current inventories of Germany or the Netherlands (both
of which have refused), or to permit U.S. companies to build the subs especially for Taiwan.
On January 15, 2002, the Reuters news service reported that the U.S. Navy hoped to present
three or four plans to the Taiwan government for building the submarines within several
months.  Among the U.S. companies reported to be interested are three owned by Northrop
Grumman, three owned by General Dynamics, and Lockheed Martin. The White House
decided not to sell Taiwan the more sophisticated Aegis battle management system and
Arleigh Burke class destroyers.
Past U.S. transfers of military-related technology have allowed Taiwan to develop more
advanced air defense and other military capabilities.  On August 1, 1999, for example, the
Pentagon announced it would sell two E-2 electronic warfare aircraft to Taiwan, along with
radar detection equipment and $150 million in aircraft spare parts. On April 17, 2000, the
Clinton Administration decided to sell Taiwan an assortment of air defense weapons,
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including PAVE PAWS radar (designed to monitor ballistic missiles); an upgraded model of
the Maverick air-to-ground missile; and the advanced medium range air-to-air missile (or
AMRAAM), with the latter to be stored in the United States unless China acquires a similar
missile capability.
U.S. Policy Statements and the “One-China” Policy.  In addition to arms sales,
Beijing routinely criticizes other aspects of U.S. support for Taiwan, saying that such actions
reduce Taipei’s interest in negotiations on reunification with the mainland.  The PRC regularly
refers to these actions as violations of the “one-China policy,” in which, over the years and
in various guises, the United States has “acknowledged” that Chinese on both sides of the
Taiwan Strait hold that there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of it.  In addition to
the TRA, U.S. policy positions on Taiwan are encapsulated in three Sino-U.S. communiques
signed in 1972, 1979, and 1982.  Relevant policy statements from these communiques are:
The “Shanghai Communique” of 1972: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese
on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a
part of China.  The United States Government does not challenge that position.
The U.S.-PRC Joint Communique on Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, 1979:
The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People’s Republic of
China as the sole legal Government of China.  Within this context, the people of the United
States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of
Taiwan....The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese
position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.
The U.S.-China Joint Communique on Arms Sales to Taiwan, 1982: The United States
Government attaches great importance to its relations with China, and reiterates that it has
no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in
China’s internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.”
In addition to the existing three communiques, the Clinton Administration in 1994 conducted
a comprehensive review of U.S. policy toward Taiwan.  In testimony before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee about the policy review, Assistant Secretary of State Winston
Lord said that the review had resulted in “a series of changes,” but that the fundamental
framework of the policy remained unchanged.  Periodically, the notion of crafting a fourth
communique concerning Taiwan has been put forward – as in a January 2, 2002 Washington
Post op ed piece by Richard Holbrooke, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.  The
U.S. government has not been receptive to such proposals.
President Clinton’s 1998 “Three Noes” Statement.  Taiwan officials and U.S.
supporters of Taiwan often saw the Clinton Administration as too willing to respond to PRC
pressure to reaffirm the U.S. “one China” policy in ways that appeared to curb support for
Taiwan.  These concerns were heightened during a summit visit to the PRC in June 1998.
During the visit, President Clinton made a controversial statement about Taiwan that some
interpreted as being a change in U.S. policy.  The statement was made in response to a
question during a discussion in Shanghai on June 30, 1998. According to a White House
transcript, the President said:
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I had a chance to reiterate our Taiwan policy, which is that we don’t support independence
for Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one Taiwan-one China. And we don’t believe that Taiwan
should be a member in any organization for which statehood is a  requirement. So I think
we have a consistent policy.
Although Clinton Administration officials insisted the President’s remarks were fully
consistent with U.S. policy, some American observers maintained that the Clinton Shanghai
statement was a distinct change from original U.S. policy  statements in the three U.S.-China
communiques of 1972, 1979, and 1982, and in the Taiwan Relations Act.  In response to the
President’s statement, then, both the House and Senate in the 105th Congress passed
resolutions (H.Con.Res. 301 and S.Con.Res. 107)  reaffirming U.S. policy toward Taiwan.
President Bush’s 2001 Policy Statement on U.S. Defense of Taiwan.  In
contrast to the case with the Clinton Administration, many observers see the George W. Bush
Administration as being less willing to pursue policies that may negatively affect Taiwan.  On
April 25, 2001, for instance, in an ABC television interview, Charles Gibson asked President
Bush that “...if Taiwan were attacked by China, do we have an obligation to defend the
Taiwanese?”  The President responded, “Yes, we do, and the Chinese must understand that.”
In followup, Gibson asked whether this meant using the full force of the American military.
The President responded, “Whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself.”  Since the United
States has no defense alliance with Taiwan and has never pledged use of American military
forces in the island’s defense, the President’s answer caused considerable controversy again
over whether the United States had changed its policy toward Taiwan’s security or was
moving away from its “one-China” statements.  State Department and White House officials,
including President Bush, later reiterated U.S. support for the “one-China policy,” insisted
that there had been no change in U.S. policy toward Taiwan, and said that the President’s
April 25 statement was consistent with U.S. commitments in the Taiwan Relations Act.
U.S. Visits by Taiwan Officials.  In the absence of official U.S. ties with Taiwan,
PRC officials argue that no high-level officials of the Taiwan government should be received
in the United States.  Mindful of PRC sensitivities on this issue, U.S. officials for years
remained unwilling to issue visas to senior Taiwan officials for U.S. visits.  This changed
dramatically on May 22, 1995, when President Clinton, bowing to substantial congressional
pressure, decided to allow Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui to make a visit to the United
States, but in his capacity as a private citizen, not as an official representing Taiwan.  Beijing
reacted strongly, holding several live-fire missile exercises in the Taiwan Strait after the Lee
visit and prior to the March 1996 presidential elections in Taiwan, where Lee was running for
re-election.  In response to the PRC military exercises, the United States sent two carrier
battle groups to the region of the Taiwan Strait.  The PRC exercises, which ended on March
25, 1996, failed to discredit Lee, who won 54% of the vote in a field of four candidates in
presidential elections.
In contrast to previous Administrations, the George W. Bush Administration has been
more accommodating in granting limited visits to senior Taiwan officials.  In June 2000,
Taiwan’s new President, Chen Shui-bian, was allowed a transit stop in New York City and
Houston on his way to Latin America.  Taiwan’s Vice-President, Annette Lu, was accorded
a similar transit stop in New York in early January 2002.  More recently, from March 9-12,
2002, U.S. officials permitted Taiwan’s Defense Minister, Tang Yao-ming, to attend a
defense conference in Florida.  While here, Minister Tang met with U.S. Deputy Secretary
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of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly.  The PRC
protested.
Policy Implications of Global Anti-Terrorism Campaign.  Some have
suggested that the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and
the Pentagon, as well as the foiled attempt resulting in a crash in Pennsylvania, may have
implications for U.S. policy calculations about Taiwan because of the U.S. efforts to build an
international coalition that includes PRC support.  The PRC itself has been the target of
bombings, sabotage, and other terrorist attacks, primarily thought to be committed by small
groups of Muslim extremists (largely Uighurs) based in Xinjiang, in the PRC’s far northwest.
For years there have been unconfirmed reports that some of these activists may, in fact, be
based in Afghanistan, receiving training from the Taliban.   Sharing this concern, the PRC has
assured Washington of its support in the anti-terrorism effort, including intelligence-sharing.
But the PRC strongly prefers that such global efforts be conducted through the auspices of
the U.N. Security Council, where it has a voice, and not purely through a U.S. unilateral
effort or a coalition of U.S. allies.  Also, PRC officials in the past have attempted to exact
policy concessions from the United States in exchange for support for U.S. initiatives.  The
PRC thus may attempt to condition its future support for the global anti-terrorism campaign
on U.S. concessions on Taiwan.
Political Liberalization
Under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek  (who ruled the Republic of China from 1945-
1975), the Nationalist Party-dominated government that had fled wholesale to Taiwan ruled
in a sometimes harsh authoritarian fashion.  Considering itself still technically at war, it
retained in position those legislative and executive officials that had served in the mainland,
and it tolerated little open political dissent.  It pursued policies of a strong national defense
against the Communist mainland and export-oriented economic growth. But widespread
international recognition of the PRC in the 1970s challenged a major source of the political
legitimacy of the Nationalist regime on Taiwan.  It was harder to argue that people on Taiwan
should accept and pay for an elaborate central government administration that included a
majority of representatives who were elected on mainland China prior to the Communist
victory there in 1949.  Nationalist leaders, particularly Chiang Kai-shek’s son, Chiang Ching-
kuo, began to institute political reforms.  They emphasized other elements in support of
Nationalist rule, noting in particular the leadership’s successful supervision of Taiwan’s
dramatic economic progress.  Chiang and his associates also were at pains to introduce to
power more “Taiwanese” — the 85% of the island’s population whose roots go back to
Taiwan prior to the influx of two million “mainlanders” fleeing the Communist victory on
mainland China.  Important Taiwanese dignitaries, including the future President, Lee
Teng-hui, were raised to high positions within the Party.
A combination of international and domestic pressures accelerated the pace of political
reform in the middle and late 1980s.  In September 1986, opponents of KMT political
dominance finally overcame years of Nationalist Party objections and formed an opposition
party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).  President Chiang Ching-kuo ended martial
law in July 1987.  Following Chiang Ching-kuo’s death in January 1988, the new President,
Lee Teng-hui, reaffirmed a commitment to reform that would legalize opposition parties and
restructure parliamentary bodies.  In 1991, President Lee ended the state of civil war with the
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PRC and the associated “temporary provisions” that had given Nationalist leaders
“emergency” powers to deal with dissent.  Members of legislative bodies elected in the
mainland over 40 years earlier retired.  An election was held to fill all seats in a new National
Assembly, and in 1992 a new legislature was elected.
In subsequent annual island-wide elections, the Nationalist Party incrementally lost
ground to the DPP and the New China Party, founded in 1993.   In the March 23, 1996
presidential elections, Lee Teng-hui won 53.9% of the vote, the DPP candidate, 21.1%, and
two conservative independents, 14.9%, and 9.9%, respectively.  In concurrent elections for
the National Assembly’s 334 seats, the Nationalists got 183 seats with 49.7% of the vote; the
DPP got 99 seats with 29.9%; and the New China Party got 46 seats with 13.7%.
Along with these political developments, Taiwan officials appeared ready to launch a
public dialogue about Taiwan’s future and the nature of Taiwan’s relations with the mainland.
A December 23-28, 1996, multiparty National Development Conference in Taiwan saw
continued strong Taiwanese opposition to Beijing’s “one country-two systems” reunification
formula and agreement on government reforms, notably the downgrading of Taiwan
provincial government functions.  The reforms passed on July 18, 1997.  In Beijing, officials
voiced concern that the decision to diminish the Taiwanese provincial government suggested
that Taiwan was determined to highlight its status as an international actor separate from
China.
Taiwan’s Presidential Elections, 2000: Change in Government.  On March
18, 2000, Taiwan voters went to the polls for only the second time to elect a new president
in a hotly contested election that was judged too close to call in the final days.  The winning
candidate in that election, Chen Shui-bian, is a member of the opposition, 14-year old DPP
Party.  The vote handed a stunning defeat to the Nationalist Party’s unbroken tenure in power
for 50 years.  With three leading presidential candidates, Chen won with 39% of the popular
vote, while an independent challenger, James Soong, ran a close second with 36.5% of the
vote.  The KMT candidate, sitting vice-president Lien Chan, ran a distant third with only 23%
of the vote.
In the early months of President Chen’s tenure in office beginning May 20, 2000, U.S.
officials generally praised him for his careful political maneuvering.  He appeared to try to
maintain a balance between the more radical, pro-independence advocates in his party while
trying to avoid antagonizing Beijing on the cross-strait issue.  Nevertheless, he was limited
domestically by his inability to gain consistent and broad support for his policy initiatives from
the legislature, which still retained a substantial Nationalist Party majority.  That changed in
the December 2001 legislative elections.
The Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) Party.  Dramatic developments occurred in
June and July 2001 in Taiwan’s political landscape.  On June 16, 2001, former President Lee
Teng-hui, the standard-bearer of the Nationalist Party for over 10 years, made a joint
appearance with President Chen Shui-bian and appeared to urge his own followers to support
Chen.  Observers speculated that the joint appearance meant that Lee was forming a political
alliance with Chen and the DPP.  Subsequently, on July 24, 2001, former Nationalist Party
members closely associated with former President Lee announced they were forming a new
political party, the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU).  This sparked heated debate in Taiwan
over the implications of the new party for Taiwan’s political scene, particularly for the
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looming December 2001 elections for Taiwan’s Nationalist-dominated legislature.  According
to early reports, the TSU will follow policies favored and even crafted by former President
Lee.  In addition, it is expected that the new TSU party will continue to operate as a coalition
with the DPP, further strengthening the position of the DPP in the legislature.  But, given
former President Lee’s reputation and political skills, some have suggested that Lee himself
may be gaining more power and influence within the DPP/TSU coalition than many initially
expected.  Observers will be watching closely in the coming months to gauge how President
Chen responds to the TSU and to Lee’s influence.
December 2001 Legislative Elections.  On December 1, 2001, Taiwan held
legislative, mayoral, and magistrate elections.  President Chen’s DPP party increased its
representation in the national legislature from 66 to 87 out of a total of 225 seats.  The results
mean that the struggling Nationalist Party has lost its majority status in the legislature for the
first time in 50 years – down from 115 seats to just 68 seats in the December 2001 elections.
The election results are likely to strengthen the position of President Chen, whose ability to
push controversial policy measures through the legislature has been hampered until now by
the divided government. Although Chen’s DPP party still does not have a legislative majority,
the DPP plurality means that Chen has a stronger chance of crafting a political coalition that
could give him effective legislative control.  Other results in the legislative elections: the
People First Party won 46 seats; the “Taiwan Solidarity Union” 13; and the New Party 1.
The remaining 10 legislative seats were taken by minority- or non-party candidates.  PRC
officials are likely be concerned about the legislative election results because they view the
DPP as a party with ambitions for Taiwan’s independence from China.
Representation between the DPP and KMT was more evenly split in the elections for
county magistrates and city mayors.  For the 23 magistrate seats, the KMT and the DPP each
won nine posts, the PFP and independent candidates each won two posts, and the New Party
won one.  (See CRS Report RS21093, Taiwan’s December 2001 Elections.)
Taiwan-Mainland Relations
Beginning with Taiwan’s relaxation of restrictions on travel to the mainland in 1987,
succeeding Taiwan governments have incrementally eased long-standing restrictions on
contacts with the PRC.  In Taiwan, cross-strait policies are under the purview of the Mainland
Affairs Council (MAC), a government body, while cross-strait talks are handled by the Straits
Exchange Foundation (SEF), a private organization authorized by the government to handle
these exchanges.  Corresponding bodies in the PRC are the government’s Taiwan Affairs
Office, while cross-strait talks are handled by the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan
Strait (ARATS).  Despite substantial and growing economic ties, the two sides have not held
official talks since October 14-19, 1998, in Shanghai and Beijing.  These talks improved the
atmosphere but did little to bridge the wide gap between the negotiating positions of Beijing
and Taipei.
Meanwhile, although Taiwan’s leaders still adhere publicly to the official policy of the
“three noes” – no contact, no negotiation, and no compromise with the PRC – unofficial
Taiwan-PRC contacts and economic ties have grown increasingly robust in the past decade.
Over 13 million visits have taken place from Taiwan to the mainland.  Over 250,000 mainland
Chinese experts, entrepreneurs and others have traveled to Taiwan for consultations and
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exchanges.  Exchanges of PRC-Taiwan scholars and experts for consultations on cross-strait
and other issues provide, in the view of some Taiwanese officials, an active “second track”
for PRC-Taiwan dialogue.  Other events in cross-strait relations have included the decision
by oil companies in the PRC and Taiwan to explore jointly offshore areas for oil; the start of
flights from Taiwan to the mainland with only a short stopover in Macao or Hong Kong; and
Taiwan’s opening to third-country ships, and selected mainland and Taiwanese ships, to carry
cargo to and from designated ports in Taiwan and on the mainland.  Official cross-strait talks,
however, have remained frozen since 1999, when then-President Lee Teng-hui made his
“state-to-state” relations comments.
President Lee’s “State-to-State” Relations Comments.  In a radio interview
given on July 9, 1999, President Lee Teng-hui said that ties between Taiwan and the PRC
should be considered on a “special state-to-state” basis.  Taiwan officials had been moving
incrementally in this direction for some time; in 1995, for instance, President Lee emphasized
that China and Taiwan were governed by “two governments,” and proposed that each side
enter international organizations “on an equal footing.”   Nevertheless, Lee’s July 1999
remark was seen by many as the most direct challenge to date concerning Beijing’s claim to
sovereignty over Taiwan. Beijing objected strenuously to the statement, saying it proved that
Lee had fundamentally changed previous policy in which Taiwan had claimed that there was
only “one China,” of which Taiwan was a part.
Developments During the Chen Administration.  In recent months, both the
PRC and Taiwan governments have made selected overtures that suggest there may be
movement possible in PRC-Taiwan relations.  In October 2001, Taiwan officials announced
they would simplify visa application procedures for professionals from the PRC, making it
easier for them to come live and work in Taiwan.  In November 2001, President Chen gave
a speech in Taiwan urging the PRC government to drop its opposition to negotiating with his
administration.  In what many are interpreting as a significant softening of PRC policy, on
January 24, 2002, PRC Vice-Premier Qian Qichen described pro-independence advocates in
the DPP as only an “extremely small number” in the Party, and he invited DPP members to
visit the mainland under a “suitable status.”  This is a notable departure from previous PRC
policy, which was not to meet or negotiate with DPP members.   Among other things, the
PRC also will allow two Taiwan banks – Chang Hwa Bank and United World Chinese
Commercial Bank – to open representative offices on the mainland.  More interestingly, in an
interview with Russia’s ITAR-TASS news agency on March 14, 2002, the deputy director
of the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office, Zhou Mingwei, suggested that the PRC may be willing
to accept the simultaneous representation of both Beijing and Taipei in the United Nations,
provided that Taiwan acknowledges the “one-China” principle.
Despite these positive signs, tensions remain.  On January 15, 2002, for instance, Taiwan
authorities announced they would add the words “Issued in Taiwan” to Taiwan passports to
avoid confusion between the PRC and Taiwan.  Beijing responded by saying that the move
demonstrated Taiwan was “inching toward independence.”  Taiwan’s relationship with the
United States also remains a source of tension.  For example, the PRC vigorously protested
the U.S. decision in March 2002 to allow Taiwan’s defense chief, Tang Yao-ming, to visit the
Untied States for meetings with senior U.S. diplomatic and military officials.  This was the
first visit of a Taiwan defense minister to the United States since the mid-1960s.  PRC
officials continue to insist that official contacts between Taiwan’s government officials and
those of any other country are inappropriate.
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PRC “White Papers”On Taiwan.   On February 21, 2000, the PRC issued its
second “white paper” about Taiwan, the first having been issued in August 1993.   In the
more recent paper, “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue,” PRC officials offered
a mix of apparent conciliatory gestures and a new ominous-sounding assertion that if Taiwan
authorities tried to indefinitely delay cross-strait talks about Taiwan’s future, then the PRC
would be “forced to adopt all drastic measures possible, including the use of force.”
Previously, the PRC had reserved the right to use force in only two instances: if Taiwan
declared independence; and if Taiwan were invaded and occupied by a foreign country.  A
Washington Post article of February 23, 2000, cited a top Pentagon official as responding to
the new statement by warning the PRC of “incalculable consequences” if the PRC resorted
to force against Taiwan.
On October 16, 2000, China published its third national security white paper, entitled
“China’s National Defense in 2000.”  The document listed China’s national defense
expenditures for 2000 at 121.29 billion renminbi – roughly U.S. $14.65 billion.  In describing
its view of the current international security situation, the white paper declared that there are
“new negative developments in the security situation” in the region.  The paper cited U.S.
weapons sales to Taiwan and consideration of the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act by the
106th Congress as some of these negative developments.  The paper also stated that if Taiwan
were invaded or continued to refuse to negotiate on reunification with China, the Chinese
government “will have no choice but to adopt all drastic measures possible, including the use
of force, to safeguard China’s sovereignty...”
China’s periodically harsh rhetoric on Taiwan has raised concerns in some policy circles
about the prospects for military conflict in the area.  The danger of military conflict first
became evident during the PRC military exercises held at the time of  Taiwan’s presidential
elections in March 1996. Following Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui’s personal visit to Cornell
University in the United States in June 1995, Beijing broke off high-level talks on cross-Strait
relations, stridently excoriated Lee for allegedly attempting to split China and lead Taiwan
toward independence, and conducted a series of military exercises designed to intimidate the
Taiwan people.
Beijing has also given top priority to checking Taiwan’s efforts to broaden its
international standing through so-called pragmatic diplomacy. Thus, it has countered
Taiwan’s efforts to establish formal relations with states already maintaining official ties with
Beijing, and it has pressed foreign governments to refuse to receive Taiwan leaders traveling
to their countries on an ostensibly private basis.  Partly as a result of PRC efforts, Taiwan
now maintains official relations with fewer than 30 countries, mostly small states in Central
America and the Caribbean, Africa, and the South Pacific. It is unable to host senior-level
meetings of the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, even though Taiwan is
a member in good standing of the group, and it has been unsuccessful in gaining even
observer status in such U.N. affiliated groups as the World Health Organization.  Both China
and Taiwan have so far dealt reasonably well with the economic consequences of the 1997-
1998 Asian economic crisis.  Politically, Taipei quickly used the crisis as an opportunity to
broaden high-level official contacts with most Southeast Asian governments seeking outside
assistance, and Beijing was unsuccessful in dissuading cash-starved Southeast Asian leaders
from seeking economic advantage through talks with senior Taiwan political leaders.
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Economic and Trade Issues
Taiwan’s economy grew rapidly (around 10% a year) in the 1970s and 1980s.  Growth
declined to around 5-6% a year in the 1990s as the economy matured.  In the past two years
however, the Taiwan economy has experienced a serious slowdown.  Second-quarter GDP
for 2001 contracted by 2.35% – Taiwan’s first economic contraction in 26 years.  Exports
were down 13.6% in the first seven months of 2001, while the unemployment rate hovered
at around 5%.  Experts blame the economic difficulties on the global economic downturn,
reduced U.S. demand for Taiwan’s information technology exports, and the sizeable transfer
of the island’s manufacturing base to the PRC; in the first half of 2001, for instance, Taiwan’s
investment in the PRC grew by 24% over the previous year.  This trend is likely to accelerate
beginning in 2002, when Taiwan authorities will lift a ban that limited Taiwanese investment
in the PRC to $50 million per project, and will abolish the need to obtain approval for
investment projects below $20 million.
The United States is Taiwan’s largest trading partner, while Taiwan is the 7th largest U.S.
trading partner.  In the year 2000, total U.S.-Taiwan trade was approximately $65 billion,
with a Taiwan surplus of approximately $16 billion. Taiwan’s chief exports to the United
States include clothing and footwear, toys, and various electronic products.  In recent years,
Taiwanese government officials have attempted to accommodate increased U.S. pressure on
trade issues.  They met many U.S. demands for greater market access for U.S. goods and
services and responded to U.S. complaints by taking stronger measures to protect U.S.
copyrights and other intellectual property rights.
Taiwan’s World Trade Organization (WTO) Accession.  After an application
process lasting 12 years, Taiwan officially joined the WTO on January 1, 2002 as “the
Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu” or, less formally,
“Chinese Taipei.”  In keeping with the PRC’s wishes, Taiwan was not admitted to the
organization until after the PRC’s accession, which occurred on December 12, 2001, after a
15-year application process.  As a result of its WTO membership, Taiwan will have to reduce
tariffs and open a number of market sectors to foreign investment, thus setting the stage for
new opportunities for U.S. businesses.  In addition, mutual membership in the WTO  is likely
to have a significant impact on PRC-Taiwan economic and trade relations.  To be in
compliance with their WTO obligations, both Beijing and Taipei will have to reduce long-
standing bilateral trade restrictions, setting the stage for direct trade links between the two
governments.
U.S. Policy Implications
The United States remains the foreign power most closely involved in PRC-Taiwan
relations.  It seeks closer relations with both the PRC and Taiwan and favors the peaceful
exchanges across the Taiwan Strait.  Yet U.S. policy faces major challenges from both Beijing
and Taipei in attempting to strike a proper political balance in the U.S.- PRC-Taiwan
triangular relationship:
! The PRC.  China’s growing economic, political and military power means
it is less likely to want to defer to the United States, Taiwan, or other
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governments.  Strong nationalistic emphasis in PRC domestic politics, along
with impending senior leadership changes later in 2002, may prompt PRC
decision makers to adhere to politically safe nationalistic positions on key
issues like Taiwan.  Moreover, U.S. policymakers interested in keeping the
PRC’s support for the global anti-terrorism campaign may be confronted
with efforts by Beijing to condition that support on concessions on Taiwan.
! Taiwan.  Despite its small size, Taiwan is a more important trading partner
for the United States than is the PRC, making U.S. economic stakes in the
island high.  Taiwan’s increasing assertiveness, rapidly changing social
conditions, and democratization place additional pressure on American
policymakers to support Taiwan’s international stature.
Judging that the U.S. “one China” policy framework no longer works, some American
experts favor U.S. negotiations with Beijing and Taipei to strike a new “strategic bargain.”
The alternative, in their view, is continued conflicting pressure from Beijing and Taipei and
related U.S. domestic interests, leading to a passive U.S. policy that would increase
confrontation and possibly military conflict.  Others judge that such negotiations would cause
more trouble than they are worth.  They believe the Administration should continue to adjust
its “one China” policy to accommodate pressures from Taipei and Beijing and their U.S.
domestic supporters.
U.S. policymakers also are called on to respond to recent prominent calls from both
sides of the Strait for the United States to “facilitate” or “mediate” a reduction in tensions.
The governments in Beijing, Taipei, and Washington maintain that the issue of Taiwan’s
reunification is to be handled by people on both sides of the Strait.  The United States is not
to mediate cross-Strait differences.  Nevertheless, officials and nongovernment opinion
leaders in both Beijing and Taipei are now forthright in urging the United States to take
positive actions to ease cross-Strait tensions.
PRC officials want the United States to press Taiwan to avoid egregious efforts to
achieve greater international recognition, and to limit arms sales to Taiwan so that Taiwanese
leaders will not be able to use such U.S. support to resist PRC efforts to achieve reunification.
Officials and observers in Taipei ask the United States to press Beijing to avoid intimidation,
and to solidify U.S. ties with Taiwan so that Taipei can deal with the PRC on a more
equitable basis.
Predictably, officials in Beijing and Taipei favor U.S. intervention that benefits their
respective sides.  There is little support for true mediation — that is, efforts by a neutral party
to get both sides to give up some significant parts of their respective negotiating positions in
order to reach a compromise solution.  Any U.S. efforts to press for such a compromise could
be portrayed as outside interference and redound negatively for U.S. relations with both
capitals.
In the economic arena, many Americans remain concerned with the large U.S. trade
deficit with Taiwan.  They call for strong action to improve the U.S. trade balance.  Others
call for strict protection of U.S. Intellectual Property Rights and enforcement of U.S. laws
against unfair trade practices.  They recognize that such action could negatively affect the
economic prosperity and related political stability of a number of important U.S. trading
IB98034 03-15-02
CRS-13
partners, including Taiwan.  But they judge that the United States has little choice but to take
firm measures to protect its own markets and economic advancement.  Concern with
American industrial competitiveness also motivates Americans who question the sale of
sophisticated U.S. industries and equipment to wealthy Taiwan enterprises.  They favor strict
review of such sales to ensure that Taiwanese investors do not reap a large competitive
advantage through investment in technologically advanced U.S. companies.  But Taiwan’s
unique status means that economic issues are often interpreted in a political context.  U.S.
supporters of Taiwan tend to emphasize the potentially negative political results that may
come from restrictive trade legislation or administrative actions aimed at Taiwan.
LEGISLATION
P.L. 107-10 (H.R. 428)
Taiwan Participation in the World Health Organization (WHO).  Requires the Secretary
of State to initiate a U.S. plan to endorse and obtain observer status for Taiwan at the annual
week-long summit of the World Health Assembly in May 2001 in Geneva, Switzerland; and
requires the Secretary of State to submit the plan to Congress in a written, unclassified report.
Introduced on February 6, 2001, and referred to the House International Relations
Committee, which marked the bill up on March 28, 2001.  The House passed the bill on April
24, 2001, by a vote of 407-0.  The Senate passed the bill, amended, on May 9, 2001, by
unanimous consent.  On May 15, 2001, the House agreed to the Senate amendment by a vote
of 415-0.  The President signed the bill into law on May 29, 2001.
S. 1438 (Levin, C.)
The Defense Authorizations Act, introduced on September 19, 2001.  Section 1216(b)
authorizes the sale of four U.S. Kidd class guided missile destroyers to the Taipei Economic
and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) in the United States (Taiwan’s unofficial
representative office in the U.S.) The destroyers authorized for sale are:  KIDD (DDG 993),
CALLAGHAN (DDG 994), SCOTT (DDG 995), and CHANDLER (DDG 996).  The
measure was taken up by the Senate on September 21, 2001.  Cloture was invoked on
October 2, 2001 (100-0), and the Senate passed the bill, amended, on the same day by a vote
of 99-0. Conference meetings were held on October 31 and November 1, 2001.
H.R. 1646 (Hyde)
The Foreign Relations Authorization Act, introduced on April 27, 2001.  Section 813
declares that notwithstanding any other provision of law, Taiwan shall be treated as the
equivalent of a major non-NATO ally for purposes of the transfer or potential transfer of
defense articles or services.  Section 814 requires the President to consult with both Congress
and with Taiwan armed forces, at the level of Vice-Chairman of the General Staff or higher,
on Taiwan’s defense needs. The House International Relations Committee marked up the bill
on May 2, 2001, and reported it (amended) on May 4, 2001 (H.Rept. 107-57).
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The House passed the bill on May 16, 2001, by a vote of 352-73, and the bill was sent to the
Senate on May 17, 2001, and referred to the Foreign Relations Committee.
H.R. 2739 (Brown, S.)
To amend P.L. 107-10 to require a U.S. plan to obtain WHO observer status for Taiwan
at the annual summit of the World Health Assembly in May 2002 in Geneva.  Introduced on
August 2, 2001, and referred to the House International Relations Committee.
CHRONOLOGY
03/12/02 — Taiwan’s Defense Minister, Tang Yao-ming, left the United States after a
three-day defense conference that included meetings with U.S. Deputy
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State
James Kelly.
01/01/02 — Taiwan enters the WTO.  
12/01/01 — In national legislative elections, the DPP made a strong showing at the
expense of the National Party, winning 87 legislative seats in the 225-member
body to the latter’s 68 seats.  The Nationalist Party lost its legislative majority
for the first time in 50 years.
09/18/01 — The WTO voted to accept Taiwan’s application for membership. 
07/24/01 — Supporters of Taiwan’s former President, KMT member Lee Teng-hui,
announced the formation of a new political party in Taiwan, the Taiwan
Solidarity Union (TSU).  The organizing meeting of the new party is
scheduled for August 12, 2001.
04/25/01 — In an ABC television interview, President Bush said that he would use the
U.S. military – do”whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself.”
04/24/01 — The Bush Administration announced it would sell Taiwan a new assortment
of defense articles, including diesel submarines, P-3C anti-submarine aircraft,
and Kidd-class destroyers. 
01/22/01 — Vincent Siew, Vice-Chairman of Taiwan’s former ruling party, the
Kuomintang (KMT), proposed establishing a “cross-strait common market”
between Taiwan and China.  
01/02/01 — For the first time in more than 5 decades, 3 Taiwan ships left Quemoy and
Matsu and later docked in the Chinese ports of Xiamen and Fuzhou. 
10/16/00 — China issued a white paper, “China’s National Defense 2000,” reinforcing its
claim that it would use force against Taiwan if Taiwan continued to refuse to
negotiate for reunification with China.  
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08/17/00 — Taiwan’s President Chen made a transit stop in Los Angeles.  Originally
invited to attend a private dinner with Members of Congress, President Chen
declined, reportedly under pressure from U.S. government officials.
05/20/00 — Chen Shui-bian was inaugurated as Taiwan’s newly elected president.  His
inauguration speech was viewed generally as a moderate attempt to lower
tensions with Beijing.
03/24/00 — President Lee Teng-hui resigned as head of the ruling Nationalist Party
because of his party’s unprecedented defeat in the presidential election. 
03/18/00 — In presidential elections in Taipei, DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian won with
approximately 39% of the vote.  
02/21/00 — The PRC issued a White Paper, “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan
Issue,” with a mix of conciliatory gestures and a new threat that Taiwan’s
indefinite delay in cross-Strait talks may prompt use of force by the PRC.  
02/01/00 — The House passed H.R. 1838, the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, by a
vote of 341-70.
11/17/99 — The ruling Kuomintang (KMT) Party expelled presidential candidate James
Soong and six of his key staff.  
07/09/99 — Taiwan’s President, Lee Teng-hui, said that ties between Taiwan and the PRC
should be conducted on a “state-to-state” basis.  
04/19/99 — Taiwan DPP leader Chen Shui-bian began several days of seminars and
meetings in Washington, DC.
02/17/99 — The U.S. Defense Department issued a congressionally mandated report on
rising military strengths on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.  The report
intensified arguments on whether the United States should provide ballistic
missile defense systems to Taiwan despite strenuous objections from Beijing.
10/23/98 — Secretary of Defense William Cohen had an unofficial meeting with Taiwan’s
armed forces chief of staff then visiting Washington.
10/19/98 — Taiwan negotiator Koo Chen-fu left Beijing after talks with Chinese party
leader Jiang Zemin and other senior officials.
01/24/98 — Elections for mayors of smaller cities, county assemblies, and city councils
showed the KMT’s continued dominance at the grass-roots level of
Taiwanese politics.  The Kuomintang won over 60% of the contested seats;
the DPP about 20%.
01/01/98 — South Africa, the most important country to maintain official ties with
Taiwan, broke off official relations and established formal ties with China.
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03/10/96 — The Pentagon disclosed that two U.S. carrier battle groups had been ordered
to the Taiwan area.
03/08/96 — PRC forces began holding ballistic missile exercises in two impact areas near
Taiwan.  The actions were condemned by Congress and the Administration.
01/24/96 — The New York Times reported on a series of explicit warnings from Chinese
leaders to the United States over the likelihood of military action in the
Taiwan Strait.
12/02/95 — In elections for the 164-seat Legislative Yuan, the KMT received 85 seats
with 45% of the vote; the DPP, 54 seats; and the New China Party, 21 seats.
05/22/95 — Yielding to congressional pressure, President Clinton decided to allow
Taiwan’s president to visit the United States the following month.
04/08/95 — President Lee Teng-hui responded to President Jiang Zemin’s eight-point
proposal on cross-Strait relations with his own proposal.
01/30/95 — China’s leader Jiang Zemin issued a positive sounding eight-point proposal on
Taiwanese-mainland relations.
09/07/94 — The Clinton Administration’s Taiwan policy review called for modestly
increased contacts with Taiwan. 
01/29/94 — In elections for numerous local councils and other posts, the Kuomintang
dominated, winning over 60% of the vote, while the DPP won about 15%.
09/02/92 — President George H.W. Bush agreed to sell 150 F-16 jet fighters to Taiwan.
07/15/87 — Martial law ended in Taiwan.
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
Tsang, Steve.  “China and Taiwan:  A Proposal for Peace,” Security Dialogue, v. 31, Sept.
2000: pp. 327-336.
Clough, Ralph N. Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait, Rowman and Littlefield,
1999.
Freeman, Charles, “Preventing War in the Taiwan Strait,” Foreign Affairs, July-August 1998.




CRS Report RS21093.  Taiwan’s December 2001 Elections, by Kerry Dumbaugh.
CRS Report 96-498.  China-U.S.-Taiwan Economic Relations, by Wayne Morrison and
William Cooper.
CRS Report RL30957.  Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990, by Shirley Kan.
CRS Report RS20187.  Taiwan’s Defense: Assessing the U.S. Department of Defense
Report, “The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait,” by Robert Sutter.
CRS Report 96-246. Taiwan: Texts of the Taiwan Relations Act and the China
Communiques, by Kerry Dumbaugh.
